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HORSE AND BUGGY LIEN LAW AND MIGRATORY
AUTOMOBILES
By FAIRFAX LEARY, JR. t *
Considerable opportunity for successful fraud now exists in inter-
state sales of second hand automobiles. This is due to the lack of
coordination between the motor vehicle registration statutes as presently
administered and the law relating to liens on automobiles. The lack
of coordination opens the door to the "skip-state" operator, so-called
because he skips out of the state without paying more than the down
payment on a car and sells it in another state for the full price. He
then absconds with the cash and leaves the person who sold him the
car and the one to whom he sold it ruefully struggling each to place the
loss on the other.
The factual pattern of this swindle is not complicated. An auto-
mobile is acquired in New York, for example, with a minimum down
payment, the balance to be paid in installments. The finance company
retains a security interest in the vehicle under a conditional sale, or a
chattel mortgage. The owner is a resident of New York, and the
contract is duly recorded in the county of his residence. The contract
usually expressly forbids removal of the car from the state without the
finance company's permission. Despite this provision, and the criminal
sanction it normally bears, the car is driven across the state line without
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the knowledge of the finance company, re-registered in the second state
either by the "skip" himself or a used car dealer to whom the vehicle
has been sold. Later the automobile in question is sold to a purchaser
who has no knowledge of the finance company's interest in the car, or,
for that matter, that the car was ever registered in another state.
Thereafter the original owner disappears without making any more
payments to the finance company. Later the finance company some-
how discovers the new location of the car and seeks to assert its lien
to collect the balance due. The local purchaser refuses to pay or give
up the car, and a law suit follows. These resales and the resulting
law suits are not concentrated in any area.' Six cases and one statute
dealt with this problem in 1947; two of the cases were in North
Carolina and one each in Arizona, Florida, Pennsylvania and
Wyoming;' the statute was enacted in New Mexico.'
What, then, are the general rules of law apparently governing
this situation? What result would a literal application of the verbal
formulae of the text books lead us to expect? The dogma is that the
law governing the creation of title interests in a chattel is the law of
the place where the chattel is when the interest is created; that is, in
the case of a conditional sale where the chattel is delivered to the buyer
and in the case of a chattel mortgage, where the chattel is located at
the creation of the mortgage. If the security interest is validly created
under the law of one state, say the books, and if the removal from
that state is without the consent of the conditional vendor or chattel
mortgagee, then the security interest will be recognized in another
state to which the chattel is removed as against the buyer, his creditors
or purchasers from him.' A minority of states, however, refuse to
follow this rul6 and prefer the interests of bona fide local purchasers
or attaching creditors over the interest of the out-of-state conditional
vendor or chattel mortgagee.'
On this state of "the law" the conditional vendor or chattel
mortgagee, usually an out-of-state finance company, would be expected
1. Ragner v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 185 P. 2d 525 (Ariz. 1947) ; Lee
v. Bank of Georgia, 32 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1947) ; Universal Finance Co. v. Clary, 227 N.
C. 247, 41 S. E. 2d 760 (1947) ; General Finance & Thrift Corp. v. Guthrie, 227 N. C.
431, 42 S. E. 2d 601 (1947) ; First National Bank of Jamestown, N. Y. v. Sheldon, 161
Pa. Super. 265, 54 A. 2d 61 (1947) ; Mosko v. Smith, 179 P. 2d 781 (Wyo. 1947).
After this article was in print an eighth case was reported. Manning v. Miller,
U 11,920 3 C. C. H. CONDITIONAL SALE & CHATTEL MORTGAGE SERVICE (Tex. Civ.
App. 1947) Y----.
2. N. M. Laws 19 , c. 64. Apparently the statute was designed to overrule the
decisions in Hart v. Oliver Farm Equipment Sales Co., 37 N. Mex. 267, 21 P. 2d 96
(1933), and Snyder v. McCain, 43 N. Mex. 231, 89 P. 2d 613 (1939). See Memo-
randum of Hugh B. Woodward in support of House Bill No. 58.
3. See, e. g., 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) §§ 268.1, 275.1; GooDRicHr, CoN-
FLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) §§ 153, 154; Lee, Conflict of Laws Relating to Install-
ment Sales, 41 MIcH. L. REv. 445, 448, 452 (1942).
4. See, e. g., GOODRICH, loc. cit supra n. 3; Lee, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 457-61.
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to win in situations similar to the basic factual pattern except in the
so-called minority states. But this is not the case. All of 'the six
1947 cases involved that factual pattern, and only one was decided in
a minority jurisdiction, yet four decisions protect the domestic pur-
chaser and only two protect the out-of-state finance company. The
statute also protects the domestic purchaser. It appears then, that
a strict application of the verbal formula of the so-called conflicts rule
does not produce results that satisfy the courts today and that we
must look elsewhere for solution.
Much has been written on the power of a state to change by its
law the title to a chattel brought into the state without the consent of the
owner of a security interest therein.5 But confusion of thought may
result from the use of the generic term "chattel," as the mind at once
considers tangible personal property generally, and not just auto-
mobiles. Special facts in the case of an automobile warrant a special
rule, and the rule will, in certain cases, require opposite results from
the general conflict of laws rule. Those who argue for the minority
rule, which protects the domestic purchaser in all cases, say "Would
you compel the purchaser to search in forty-eight or more jurisdic-
tions?" But the answer is "No, they need look in only one state-
the state plainly indicated to them by the license plate and registration
certificate of the car, and a check can be made by use of the telegraph
very quickly."
For example, in MacCabe v. Blymyre, an early Pennsylvania case,
still cited in decisions relating to automobiles, Doctor De Lacey,
resident of Maryland and owner of a horse, executed a chattel mortgage
thereon which was duly recorded in Maryland. Thereafter the doctor
moved his residence to Bedford, Pennsylvania and opened an office
for the practice of his profession. He then sold the horse to Blymyre
for value. The Maryland chattel mortgagee's action for replevin was
dismissed, the court saying "Would it be reasonable to require that
[Blymyre] should have first ascertained where this migratory doctor
came from, and then have had the records of all counties of Maryland
searched for chattel mortgages ?" 6
But should horse and buggy precedent apply to automobiles? So
far as the minority rule protecting local purchasers is concerned the
5. See, e. g., Beale, Jurisdiction Over Title of Absent Owner in a Chattel, 40
HARv. L. REv. 805 (1927); CooK, LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS, 86 (1942) ; Carnahan, Tan qible PropertV and the Conflict of Laws, 2 U. OF
CHI. L. REv. 345 (1935); Leflar, Constitutional Jurisdiction Over Tangible Chattels,
2 Mo. L. REv. 171 (1937) ; Note, The Power of a State to Affect Title in a Chattel
Atypically Removed to It, 47 COL. L. REv. 767 (1947) ; Note, Conflict of Laws, the
Chattel Mortgage and Conditional Sale, 18 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 553 (1941).
6. 9 Phila. 615, 616 (C. P. Bedf. Co. 1872). For a case involving two horses and
a wagon and reaching the same result see M'Kaig v. Jones, 3 Pa. L. J. 365, 2 Clark
365 (C. P. Somerset Co. 1842).
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universal requirement of a license plate and a registration card show-
ing not only the state but also the county from which the car has
come, seems a conclusive basis for a negative answer. Moreover, with
modern communication facilities, it places no great burden on pur-
-chasers to require that they check for liens in the state from which the
vehicle has come. But it does not follow that the out-of-state encum-
brancer should prevail in every case. To determine what the proper
basis of decision should be, however, we must consider in more detail
the various ways in which liens ' on automobiles are recorded, the
effect of changing registration of the car to another state and, in some
detail, what common factors can be found in decisions protecting the
local purchaser.
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS
Based upon the legislative provisions governing the recording of
liens upon motor vehicles, the states can be grouped into four categories,
a group of "non-title" states and three groups of "title" states, so
called because the state issues with respect to each automobile registered
in the state a document called a certificate of title, or of some similar
designation. As to each category, those dealing with the car in a state
other than the one in which it is registered can tell the state and county
from which the car has come, but the procedure for determining
whether any liens exist will vary. Serious defects, however, exist in
each category and it is the purpose of this article to propose system
which may eliminate most of these defects.
Seventeen states are called "non-title" states.' Liens in these
states are recorded in the several counties, and inquiry must be made
at the county clerk's office in the county of the owner's residence. The
certificates of title issued in the other groups of states to a greater
or lesser extent determine rights in and to the car. For example,
failure to transfer the certificate of title with the car may in some states
void the sale, subject the purported "seller" to liability for the torts
7. The word lien is loosely used in this article to include every non-possessory
security interest.
8. The grouping by types of statute was suggested by Byse, Automobiles, Record-
ing of Encumbrances, Certificate of Title, 12 Wis. L. REv. 92 (1936). Byse's first
group of title states with certificates making no mention of liens seems to have disap-
peared. The following seventeen states do not issue certificates of title: Alabama,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee and Vermont. In 1939, the Arkansas legislature passed a title act but has
not yet made any appropriation to put the law into effect, consequently no certificates
of title have been issued by Arkansas. Letter from Chief, Motor Vehicle Division,
Arkansas, Oct. 28, 1947. The 1946 Report of Committee on Laws and Ordinances of
the President's Highway Safety Conference lists 18 non-title states, including New
Jersey, but evidently N. J. Laws 1946, c. 136 was not called to their attention.
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of the "purchaser", or preclude the purported purchaser from claim-
ing an insurable interest.'
The title certificate statutes fall into three categories, based upon
their treatment of liens upon motor vehicles. One group enters on the
certificate only those liens upon the car disclosed in the application
for a certificate."° Application need only be made when the car is sold
to a new owner. This type of statute can have a very misleading
effect. Liens created in course of acquisition of the car may show
up thereon, but no provision is made for keeping the certificate up to
date, should the owner borrow after he has acquired the vehicle, or
finance his purchase otherwise than through the seller. 1a That is to
say, there is no provision for noting on the certificate of title a lien
created after the certificate has been issued by the state authorities.
Thus a prospective purchaser, without actual notice of any liens, can
only safeguard himself from the unexpected taint of "constructive
notice" by making a local title search, just as in the states requiring
liens to be recorded in the county clerk's office and issuing no certificate
of title at all-the so-called "non-title" states.
A second group of states issue certificates of title which have the
same defect, but these laws provide a partial solution by requiring all
liens upon automobiles to be recorded centrally, usually in the office of
a Commissioner of Motor Vehicles or some similar office."
There is a third group of thirteen jurisdictions which have gone
further and made the certificate of title a positive recording device,
9. See, e. g., Comment, A Comparison of Land and Motor Vehicle Registration,
48 YA.LE L. J. 1238, 1246 et seq. (1939) ; Comment, Automobiles-Registration of Title
and Tramfer-Effect on Ownership, 37 MicH. L. Rxv. 758 (1939).
10. CoLO. STAT. ANN., c. 16, § 2 (Supp. 1946) ; ILL. ANN. STAT., C. 95%, § 77 (Smith-
Hurd, Cum. Supp. 1946); Ind. Laws 1945, c. 304, § 11; KAN. GEN. STAT. § 8-135(c)
(1) (Supp. 1937), as amended by Laws 1941, H. B. 206; MD. ANN. CODE, art. 66Y2,
§ 22 (Flack, 1939), as amended by Laws 1947, c. 17; MIcH. ComP. LAWS § 4659 (Ma-
son, Supp. 1940), as amended by Acts 1945, No. 272; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-52a
(1943) ; N. D. REv. CODE § 39-0505 (1943) ; OKLA. STAT., tit. 47, § 23.3 (1941) ; S. D.
CODE § 44.0202 (1939); WASH. Comip. STAT. § 6312-4a (Remington, 1932), as amended
by Laws 1947, H. B. 204; W. VA. OFF. CODE, c. 17, art. 7, § 1 (1931) ; WIs. STAT.
§ 85.01(3) (1943) ; Wyo. REv. STAT. § 60-207 (1945), as amended by Laws 1947, S.
B. 40.
10a. 'Each state desires to accord full faith and credit to certificates of title issued
in other States, but this will not be practicable, nor will innocent purchasers be pro-
tected, unless and until all of the states enact uniform requirements in regard to cer-
tificates of title, requiring in every instance that any chattel mortgage or other lien,
except a lien dependent upon possession, shall be filed or that a copy of the instrument
be filed with the [State Highway] department." PRESIDENT'S RIGHWAY SAFETY CON-
FERENcE, REPORT OF COMMITTEE ONq LAWS AND ORDINANCES 42 (1946). But see infra
note 14, for present administrative practice which indicates that the Certificates are
being accepted in other states as evidence of an unencumbered title when such is not
the fact. See also note 57 for the reason given by one state commissioner for his
failure to make any investigation.
11. FLA. STAT. §319.15 (1941); Nev. Laws 1931, c. 202, §§15(a), (c) added by
Laws 1945, c. 240; N. J. REv. STAT, § 46:32-13 and § 39:10-11 (1937), as amended by
Laws 1946, c. 136; N. M. STAT. ANN. § 68-115 (1941) as amended by Laws 1943, c.
73; ORE. Comp. LAws ANN. § 68-203 (Supp. 1943).
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denying protection to liens not entered on a certificate of title."2 Some
of this last group provide for local entry by the clerk of court, others
for central filing and entry by a Commissioner of motor vehicles.
But almost all states have neglected the problem of the out-of-state
lien when application is made to have license plates and registration
or certificate of title issued with respect to an out-of-state car. As to
such liens all but three states appear to rely upon the quaint theory that
an applicant, under oath but not subject to cross examination, will tell
the truth in a matter against his interests and involving a chattel so
valuable that its acquisition has provided the motive for murder."
Some of these states require a notarized bill of sale which would
disclose any lien reserved to the seller, but no more. 4 Thus when the
car was originally registered in a non-title state, the "skip" operator
can quite easily re-register it in another state by using a fake bill of
sale and thus obtain a clean title to enable him more readily to dupe
his prospective purchasers. Or, as is more commonly the case, a
dealer-purchaser of an out-of-state car will re-register the car using the
clean bill of sale given him by the "skip." " A purchaser from the
12. Local entry: Mo. REV. STAT. § 3488 (1939), as amended by Laws 1941, H. B.
No. 321; NEB. REv. STAT. § 60-110 (1943) ; OHIO ANN. CODE § 6290-9 (Page, 1945).
Central filing: ARIz. CODE ANN. § 66-231 (1939); CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 195, 196
(Deering, 1937), as amended by Laws 1947, c. 697; DEL. REV. CODE, c. 165, art. 3,
§5574 (1935), as amended by Laws 1937, c. 220; D. C. CODE §§40-702, 7 (1940) ;
IDAHO CODE § 48-402 (1932), as amended by Laws 1945, c. 99; MONT. REv. CODE, Vol.
I, c. 152, § 1758.3 (1935), as amended by Laws 1945, c. 63; PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 75,
§ 33 (Purdon, Supp. 1947) and Acts 1945, No. 434, § 5; Tex. Laws 1939, H. B. No.
407, § 44; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-3a-80 to 57-3a-86 (1943) ; VA. CODE § 2154(64) (b)
(1942).
There are some statutes not listed above which do provide for a notation of subse-
quent liens upon the certificate of title, but which do not specifically provide that such
notation constitutes constructive notice. See, e. g., Wyo. Laws 1947, S. B. 40, 3 C. C.
H. CONDITIONAL SALE & CHATTEL MORTGAGE SERVICE, 16,262. In view of the decision
in Kaufmann & Baer v. Monroe Motor Line Transportation, Inc., 124 Pa. Super. 27,
187 AUt. 296 (1936), under the former similar wording of the Pennsylvania statute, that
the certificate of title was not constructive notice, such statutes are not classed as
"positive recording" statutes.
13. See p. 465 infra. See State v. Bradley, 55 A. 2d 114 (Conn. 1947) for a case
involving three separate homicides to obtain possession of three automobiles which were
separately sold in the New York market.
14. In an effort to ascertain administrative practice, information was requested
from all state motor vehicle authorities as to what supporting documents or other evi-
dence was required when application was made for registration of and for a certificate
of title with respect to a vehicle formerly registered in another state. Replies from
some 39 jurisdictions were sufficiently full to permit comparison of their practices. The
usual division between the so-called "proof of ownership" states and those relying
exclusively upon the applicant's own statements was observed.
Two states stated that they required a bill of sale to the applicant, but twenty-six
states reported that they required the applicant to produce either a certificate of title
or the registration receipt and such bills of sale as might be necessary to complete the
chain of title from the last title-holder or registered owner and the applicant. Four
of these states reported that they also required the bill of sale by which the registered
owner acquired title to the car, although one of these apparently required it solely for
the purpose of assessing the ad valorent tax. Three states require a lien search in the
state of origin. See note 58 infra.
15. Of the states requiring an applicant to file proof of ownership, the great bulk
required bills of sale only from last registered owner to applicant. This practice can
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dealer will, then, so far as he can tell, buy a locally registered car.
Strict application of the conflicts dogma protecting the out-of-state
lienor can work very real hardship in this situation, as there is no notice
to the sub-purchaser indicating any necessity to inquire for liens in
another state. 6 Small wonder, then, that courts have strained to find
exception to the general rule.
THE 1947 CAsEs
One such exception to the general rule is illustrated by General
Finance & Thrift Corporation v. Guthrie, one of the two cases decided
in 1947 by the North Carolina Supreme Court." The plaintiff, a
Georgia finance company, financed the sale of an automobile to a man
named York in Atlanta, Georgia on Thursday, May 30, 1946, just
before the holiday and ensuing week end. Georgia is a non-title state
with local recording of liens. Plaintiff did not record its security
interest until the following Wednesday, June 5, 1946. York, a resident
of Georgia at the time, although formerly a North Carolinian, drove
the car into North Carolina and sold it to one Hodges, a used car
dealer, on June 12, a week later. The car was thereafter registered in
North Carolina and given North Carolina license plates. In this condi-
tion it was purchased by defendant Guthrie. Plaintiff sued to obtain
possession of the vehicle. The lower court directed a verdict for the
out-of-state finance company as the dogma of the text books would
lead us to expect. But the evidence was not clear as to when York
had driven the car out of Georgia. Guthrie's lawyer contended that
the automobile had been removed from Georgia on June third, and
there was evidence to support this contention. There was also con-
trary evidence. If the June third removal date was the correct one
(the argument ran), the car had been removed prior to the recording
of plaintiff's contract, so that when the lien was recorded there was
nothing in the state to which the lien could attach. The appellate
court held that the direction of a verdict for plaintiff was error, and
the case was remanded for trial on the issue of the date of removal.
be especially misleading when the car was previously registered in a state where condi-
tional sales retain their common law validity without recordation. Fortunately, after
allowing for "title" laws, only five states remain in this category. They are Arkansas,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Rhode Island and Tennessee. For a case involving a fake
bill of sale, see Ragner v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 185 P. 2d 525 (Ariz.
1947), discussed supra, p. 456.
16. Several states require dealers to register a vehicle locally before reselling it, but
Florida has now apparently required that out-of-state origin be shown. See Fla. Laws
1947, c. 23658 (No. 44) S. B. No. 108, Sec. 4.
17. 227 N. C. 431, 42 S. E. 2d 601 (1947). The court distinguished Mack Inter-
national Truck Corp. v. Wilkins, 219 N. C. 327, 13 S. E. 2d 529 (1941) on the ground
that the property there involved was physically located in the other state when the
lien was there recorded. Cf. Universal Finance Co. v. Clary, 227 N. C. 247, 41 S. E.
2d 760 (1947), also following the so-called majority rule. See Annotations 57 A. L. R.
702, 714, and 148 A. L. R. 375, 380.
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The court's reasoning (or rather, the reasoning of the prior
Wyoming decision relied upon by the court) I was, as Guthrie con-
tended, that the lien was not valid until recorded, and due to the re-
moval of the car there was nothing to which the lien could attach
when filed for record. This smacks of medieval scholasticism. The
purpose of recording, a layman would say, is to give notoriety to an
otherwise secret lien, to provide a method by which a prospective pur-
chaser could check up on the truth of the statements of his seller
as to liens on the car. When is the notoriety needed? When will
the check-up be made? Not when York drove across the border into
North Carolina, but when the sale was made--or at the earliest when
negotiations started with Hodges, the dealer. Our hypothetical lay-
man would argue that Hodges saw that the car had Georgia plates,
and that the registration card gave York's address as Augusta, Georgia.
Hodges could easily have telegraphed the county clerk in Georgia for
a statement of liens. Had he done so, the reply would have disclosed
the plaintiff's interest regardless of the time when the car was driven
out of the state. However, if we regard the court's reasoning merely
as a means of protecting Guthrie, the sub-purchaser, who had no notice
of the Georgia origin of the car, our criticism boils down to this: did
the court have to adopt a theory that would protect the dealer who
knew about the Georgia origin in order to protect the sub-purchaser
who did not? We think not, but of this more anon.
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Lee v. Bank of Georgia,19
another of the 1947 cases, also decided in favor of the local purchaser,
notwithstanding the general rule. Again it was a Georgia car that
was involved but the lien was recorded while the car was in Georgia.
The facts were that one Willson, then a resident of Fulton county,
Georgia, obtained a loan from the Bank of Georgia upon the security of
a chattel mortgage on his Dodge automobile. That chattel mortgage
was recorded. Thereafter the car was sold to Howard Marsh of
Jacksonville, Florida, and Marsh was issued a Florida certificate of
title showing no liens. There were, of course, no liens filed against
the car in the office of the motor vehicle commissioner where liens on
automobiles, under Florida law, are required to be filed.20 The car
was then sold to defendant Lee. The court applied the Florida
certificate-of-title and central recording law to defeat the claim of the
finance company, ruling that the statute excluded enforcement of any
unfiled lien against a purchaser for value and without notice. The
18. Yund v. First National Bank, 14 Wyo. 81, 82 Pac. 6 (1905).
19. 32 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1947).
20. Florida's general recording statute is Florida Statute, 1941, Sec. 698.01. The
central recording provision of the "Title" law is Florida Statute, 1941, Sec. 319.15.
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theory of this decision is interesting because it enables the court to
protect the local purchaser of a locally registered car, but does not
involve a theory that also protects one dealing with the vehicle when
it still carries license plates indicating an out-of-state origin.
In First National Bank of Jamestown v. Sheldon, the Pennsyl-
vania Superior Court was faced with almost the same problem.2
Sheldon, a resident of New York, a non-title state, gave plaintiff a
chattel mortgage on his automobile purchased in New York. Plaintiff
duly filed in New York. Thereafter, Sheldon drove into Pennsylvania
and sold the car to one Mychauda doing business as Northampton Auto
Exchange. Mychauda then obtained Pennsylvania plates and certificate
of title and sold the car to defendant Mack. On discovering the facts,
plaintiff attempted to replevy the car from Mack, joining Sheldon as
defendant. Mychauda appeared as an intervening defendant.
Despite the fact that the car was in New York when plaintiff
recorded, the Pennsylvania court reversed a judgment below for plain-
tiff and entered judgment for Mack and Mychauda, on the ground that
chattel mortgages were unenforceable in Pennsylvania unless specifi-
cally authorized by statute. The Court ruled that the 1945 Chattel
Mortgage Act gave no validity to New York chattel mortgages on
automobiles, as liens on motor vehicles were exempted from the opera-
tion of that Act." During the course of his opinion, Dithrich J.
characterized Mychauda as "an innocent purchaser for value (who)
. . . had no notice of the lien recorded in favor of the plaintiff in the
State of New York," thus protecting the dealer who purchased a New
York car.
The Pennsylvania court apparently overlooked the exact wording
of the exception in the statute. The exception only applies to a "motor
vehicle for which a certificate of title is issuable" under the Pennsyl-
vania Motor Vehicle Code, 23 and this clearly does not include a New
York car owned by a resident of New York, which was the situation
when defendant Mychauda, the dealer, purchased the car. As to the
ultimate purchaser, the defendant Mack, it would be more valid to
assert that he was protected by the certificate-of-title law, as the Florida
court did in the Bank of Georgia case just discussed.
In Mosko v. Smith,24 coming before the Wyoming Supreme Court
in 1947, removal of the car from the state prior to recording was again
21. 161 Pa. Super. 265, 54 A. 2d 61 (1947).
22. Act of June 1, 1945, P. L. 1358, PA. STAT. ANx., tit. 21, §940.1 (Purdon,
Supp. 1947).
23. Act of May 1, 1929, P. L. 905, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 75, § 33 (Pur-
don, Supp. 1947).
24. 179 P. 2d 781 (Wyo. 1947).
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used as a ground for protecting the local purchaser. The facts were
that one "Ed." Orr owned a car used primarily by his wife. They
lived in Wyoming and the car bore Wyoming plates and was registered
in Wyoming at all times. Orr separated from his wife and acquired
a residence in Leadville, Colorado. His wife continued to use the car
until shortly before October 25, 1944, when Orr obtained possession
of the automobile and removed it to Leadville. Then on October 25,
1944, in Colorado, Orr mortgaged the car to plaintiff. The statement
of facts laconically tells us that the estranged wife came to Leadville
and took the car back to Wyoming before November 3, 1944. No
details of the transaction between husband and wife at that time are
divulged. On November 3, 1944, plaintiff recorded his mortgage in
Colorado. On August 1, 1945, Orr assigned his certificate of title
to Major, who in turn sold to defendant Nell Smith. A new certificate
of title was issued to Nell Smith by Wyoming. Plaintiff then brought
suit in Wyoming to assert his lien, but the court protected Nell Smith
on the ground that the car had been removed from Colorado before
plaintiff filed his lien.
Here again, but for the prompt and possibly irate action of the
estranged wife strict application of conflicts dogmas would have worked
injustice on poor Nell Smith. No method of search would have
revealed the Colorado lien, and nothing would tell her to look to
Colorado, for we may assume that Orr's certificate of title showed a
Wyoming residence. But if we consider whether the plaintiff could
have taken action to protect itself, we can justify the result on
other grounds. Here the Colorado finance company was offered as
security a car with Wyoming plates. True, the prospective borrower,
a former resident of Wyoming, was the registered owner. He claimed
to be now a resident of Colorado, and undoubtedly satisfied the com-
pany of his residence and employment. But in such a case, why wasn't
the car re-documented in Colorado? On the other hand, filing could
as easily have been accomplished in Wyoming, and the cost would
not be excessive even if the Wyoming filing was in addition to the
Colorado filing. Here, too, the court, in effect, protected a person deal-
ing with an automobile, who examined only in the state in which the
car was registered.
These are the four cases protecting the local purchaser. In all
four cases the car bore license tags of the state in which it was located
at the time of sale, and in all four cases the court protected the local
purchaser.
Of the two cases protecting the out-of-state finance company,
one was Universal Finance Company v. Clary, decided in 1947 by the
HORSE AND BUGGY LIEN LAW
Supreme Court of North Carolina. 5 Here a car was purchased in
Maryland and a chattel mortgage placed thereon, which was clearly
recorded in Maryland. The car was diven to North Carolina and
there sold. But at the time of sale the car was still registered in Mary-
land and carried Maryland plates. The trial court charged the jury
that when defendant bought the car it bore a Maryland license plate
and that no sufficient inquiry was made to ascertain what liens, if
any, were recorded against it in Maryland. No objection was made
to the charge, and, on appeal, since no objection was made at the trial,
the holding was that error, if any, in the charge could not be raised
for the first time in the appellate court. The charge of the trial judge
has only the weight due a nisi prius ruling, but the ruling contains
the seed of a possible solution to our problem, namely how to protect
adequately the legitimate interests of both the local purchaser and the
out-of-state finance company in these cases.
Our final case is Ragner v. General Motors Acceptance Corpora-
tion, the 1947 case from Arizona.26 In this case the court did not
protect the local purchaser buying a locally registered car. The facts
were that one Bernace Lee Franklin, representing himself as H. G.
Franklin of Kilgore, Gregg County, Texas, purchased a car in Lou-
isiana, and gave a chattel mortgage to secure the payment of the
installments due on the unpaid portion of the price. The car was
registered and licensed in Louisiana, apparently in the name of H. G.
Franklin, Kilgore, Texas." The chattel mortgagee, the finance com-
pany, recorded its mortgage in Gregg County, Texas and in Caddo
Parish, Louisiana, where the sale was made. Louisiana is a non-title
state. Franklin drove to Arizona and exactly one week after his Lou-
isiana purchase made application for an Arizona certificate of title,
presenting his Louisiana registration card and a fake bill of sale from
a Louisiana vendor who supposedly resided in Vernon Parish, Lou-
isiana. Arizona issued a certificate of title on the same day that ap-
plication was made. Four days later Franklin sold the car to a used
car dealer in Arizona. The finance company by a curious coincidence
found out where the car was on the same day that the dealer sold the
car to defendant Helen Ragner and on that day attempted to file its
mortgage with the Arizona Highway Department. The Department
refused to accept the filing and issued a certificate to Miss Ragner
showing a clear title. A lawsuit resulted. Arizona had previously
25. 227 N. C. 247, 41 S. E. 2d 760 (1947).
26. 185 P. 2d 525 (Ariz. 1947).
27. Telegram from counsel states "Do not have registration card, but original ap-
plication for registry stamped 'Transferred to H. G. Franklin, Kilgore, Texas.'"
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adopted the so-called majority rule of conflict of laws 28 and so Miss
Ragner's lawyer contended that the 1937 certificate of title law had
changed the result of the prior cases. This contention the court
rejected, saying:-
"We are of the opinion that the statute [1937 Title Act]
contains no implied abrogation of the rule set forth in the Forgan
case. The statute was not intended to have extra-territorial effect
other than would be accorded it through the rule of comity. This
statute sets forth the modus operandi for registering motor
vehicles, securing certificates of title, and establishing liens in the
state by and for the citizens of this state. The statute specifically
says that a lien can be acquired only in the manner set forth in
the statute, and that the instrument creating the lien 'shall be
executed in the manner required by the laws of this state .
It is inconceivable that the legislature contemplated that it had the
authority or was attempting to set forth the manner in which other
states might create the means for establishing liens. . . . Though
the language of the statute is broad enough to authorize the inter-
pretation contended for by appellants, certainly it is not compelling
nor do we believe that it is warranted." 29 (Italics supplied).
Miss Ragner lost her car to the finance company, unless, of course,
she was later able to make a deal with General Motors Acceptance
Corporation to keep the car upon payment of what was due them
under the Franklin contract."0 She would, however, be able to recover
from the dealer whatever out-of-pocket loss she might suffer as damages
for his breach of warranty of title, at least in the normal case. 1
What the Arizona court held to be inconceivable, the legislature in
the adjoining state of New Mexico did expressly. In 1947 New
Mexico passed a statute expressly providing that no security interest
in an automobile created pursuant to the laws of another state would be
given recognition in New Mexico unless the other state was a title
state and used its certificate of title as a positive recording device,
referring apparently to the third group of so-called title states men-
28. Forgan v. Bainbridge, 34 Ariz. 408, 274 Pac. 155 (1928) ; Davis v. Standard
Accident Ins. Co., 35 Ariz. 392, 278 Pac. 384 (1929).
29. 185 P. 2d 525, 528 (Ariz. 1947).
30. Ragner could here show a chain of assignment from the conditional vendor
and claim to stand in his shoes. Indeed, if the local purchaser has not paid the full
purchase price, courts wishing to protect him could still giire some protection to the
finance company by protecting the purchaser only to the extent of his payments, upon
analogy to the pro tanto protection accorded an innocent purchaser of land under the
recording system. See, e. g., Durst v. Daugherty, 81 Tex. 650, 17 S. W. 388 (1891);
2 Po=Roy, EQurrY § 650 (5th ed. 1941).
31. Uxiroam SALEs AcT § 13 (3) ; 1 WLLISTON, SALas § 218 (2d ed. 1924). Of
course, the terms of sale might expressly negative a warranty of title, but in such a
rare case, the purchaser probably was taking his chances.
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tioned before.3" The effect of the statute then is to protect all local
purchasers of automobiles from non-title states, even though the license
plates and registration card indicate its origin.
Looking back over our 1947 data, we find that the Florida court
thought the certificate of title statute was sufficient to protect the local
purchaser, while the Arizona court did not. The North Carolina and
Colorado courts relied upon the fortuitous circumstance that the car
in question might have been taken out of the other state before the
security interest was recorded to protect the local purchaser. The
Pennsylvania court relied upon its ancient animosity to chattel mort-
gages to protect the local purchaser. But the common factor that
emerges is that in every situation in which local purchasers were
protected, the case involved an individual who purchased a car bearing
the license plate of his own state, and no search indicated to him by
the available documents would have disclosed the security interest
created in the other state, or for that matter, that the car came from
another state. More will be said concerning this at a later point, in
the discussion of sales to used car dealers.
In two of the cases, the Guthrie and Sheldon cases, 3 the decisions
also protect the dealer who purchased the car when it carried the plates
of another state. The next phase of the inquiry, then, is to determine
whether this protection was either necessary or desirable. Apparently
both courts felt compelled to go the whole way. Apparently they felt
either that the security interest of the out-of-state finance agency is
paramount, or that the interests of all domestic purchasers must prevail.
Certainly, if examined exclusively as a conflict of laws problem, the
issue would appear to be whether, as a matter of jurisdiction, or
comity, or choice of law, the courts should recognize out-of-state liens.
If, as now urged by those writing in the field, we recognize that "the
choice of law to govern conflicting title interests in chattels is the
expression of a choice between the relative merits of the interests that
are at issue," 34 we can adopt an intermediate position: we can give
protection to the out-of-state finance company as long as the car
carries out-of-state plates, but protect local purchasers buying auto-
32. See notes 2 and 12 supra. Apparently only the liens created in the states listed
in note 12 could qualify for protection under the statute. While the statute was prob-
ably designed to relieve local purchasers, finance companies and dealers from danger,
it is difficult to see why it will not have the effect of an invitation to a New York "skip-
state" operator to try the New Mexico market, especially if the validity of a New
Mexico purchaser's title is recognized elsewhere. See, e. g., W. H. Applewhite Co.
v. Etheridge, 210 N. C. 433, 187 S. E. 588 (1936) ; Fuller v. Webster, 28 Del. 538, 95
At. 335 (Super. Ct. 1915), aff'd. wio op. by necessity, 29 Del. 297, 99 Atl. 1069 (1916).
Contra: Forgan v. Bainbridge, 34 Ariz. 408, 274 Pac. 155 (1928) ; Meyer v. Equitable
Credit Co., 174 Ark. 575, 297 S. W. 846 (1927).
33. Supra notes 17 and 21.
34. Note, 47 CoL. L. REv. 767, 785-86 (1947).
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mobiles that are locally registered without notice of an out-of-state
security interest in the car.
The Guthrie and Sheldon decisions are correct under this inter-
mediate view in protecting the sub-purchasers, at least on the facts
that we have, because they had no notice that the car was an out-of-
state one. Both are wrong in protecting the local dealer who bought
the car when it had out-of-state plates. Let us forget for the moment
about state lines and rules of conflict of laws. Consider the question
as to the local dealers as if it were purely a matter of local law. On
which party should we place the loss involved in dealing with the
"skips," the finance company or the dealer?
THE FIRST PURCHASER
The Pennsylvania Superior Court in the Sheldon case concluded
its argument protecting the dealer with:
"Furthermore, applying the universally accepted principle
that when one of two innocent persons must suffer through the
fraud of a third person, the one who made it possible for the fraud
to ,be perpetrated must bear the loss, it readily appears that the loss
in this case should be borne by the mortgagee who, by permitting
the mortgagor to remain in possession of the automobile, placed
him in a position to perpetrate a fraud upon innocent purchasers
without notice of the mortgage which he did in fact perpetrate on
appellants." 11
Application of this principle, however, requires that we first deter-
mine whether the foreign lender, or seller as the case may be, and the
domestic used car dealer are both "innocent persons," or perhaps are
two equally innocent persons, and that we next determine "the one
who made it possible for the fraud to be perpetrated." But, in situa-
tions of the type we are discussing here, the fraud cannot be successful
unless two people are victimized, the foreign finance agency who first
dealt with the swindler and the local purchaser who was the second
victim. The swindler must obtain a car on credit, so the one giving
credit is the first victim. Then to be successful the swindler must sell
the car to his second victim in order to obtain the cash which is the
object of his scheme. Unless we are to make the maxim merely an
automatic device for placing the loss in all cases upon the first person
dealing with the swindler, we must consider with some care just what
is meant by "making it possible for the fraud to be perpetrated," and
equally what is meant by "innocent." If, for argument's sake, it be
conceded that the second person dealing with the swindler can, in cases
35. 161 Pa. Super. 265, 270, 54 A. 2d 61, 63 (1947).
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where the maxim is held applicable, so conduct himself as to be the
one to bear the loss, we can see more clearly the true nature of our
inquiry. In other words, we must consider the means available to
each victim to enable him so to conduct himself in the transaction as to
prevent the perpetration of a fraud; and whether each such person made
use of the available means. Thus, the verbal formulae "the one who
made it possible for the fraud to be perpetrated" needs further
refinement.
If by that formula we mean the person who set in motion the
chain of events resulting in the commission of a fraud, then the formula
should be rephrased to read simply, "When one of two innocent persons
must suffer through the fraud of a third person, the first of the two
to deal with the defrauder must bear the loss." On the other hand,
borrowing an analogy from tort law, we could argue that the second
victim should bear the loss if he had the "Last Clear Chance" of avoid-
ing fraud and failed to use methods readily and easily available to him.
That is to say, if the second person dealing with the defrauder could,
in the exercise of normal prudent business methods, have found out
about the lien, and did not do so, the loss should fall on the second
victim, not the first. To state the matter another way, it is an unusual
situation if both persons dealing with the automobile "skip" have
used the same degree of care and exercised the same amount of pre-
caution in view of the means of protection available to each. In this
light, our inquiry on the skip-state automobile cases becomes at the
outset one of determining whether one of the two victims used all of
the means available to him to eliminate the possible commission of a
fraud.
In the Guthrie and Sheldon cases it seems to us that the dealers
were not as innocent as the finance agencies. In the first place, con-
sider the business situation. Automobile dealers are engaged in a
well-organized business. Its annual volume is in the neighborhood of
four billion dollars, and automobile installment sales may well be about
half of the entire amount of consumer installment credit.36 Credit
bureaus are used in investigating the status of potential purchasers.
There is evidence that these bureaus are also used to check on possible
liens against used cars turned in by the purchaser. Services exist
which supply dealers in used cars with charts showing state by state
the methods used to record liens against automobiles.
36. The dollar volume of automobile installment sales is difficult to estimate. In
1939 and 1940 it has been estimated at 2.3 billion dollars and 2.8 billion dollars, respec-
tively. Cox, THE EcoNoMIcs OF INSTALLMENT BUYING, Table 11, c. 2 (to be pub-
lished 1948). This compares with total installment sales of 3.7 billion dollars and 4.5
billion dollars, respectively. The estimates, of course, are rough. Assuming that the
2.3 and 2.8 figures represent 60% of total sales, we arrive at the four billion dollar
figure used in the text for total sales.
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BUSINESS PRACTICE
What is the general practice in this business with regard to in-
quiring as to possible liens? What do used car dealers generally do
to protect themselves against liens when an out-of-state car is offered
to them for cash or as a "trade-in" on a more expensive model? An
informal inquiry was made of an admittedly inadequate selection of
used car dealers in West Philadelphia.3 7  Some smaller dealers stated
that they did not bother with out-of-state cars. They felt that they
could not afford to risk a potential loss if the out-of-state car were
stolen or subject to valid liens. Others subscribed to one of various
services which supplied them, at a cost as low as ten dollars a year,
with up-to-date charts showing, state by state, the method by which
liens on automobiles are recorded. When offered an out-of-state car
deal, this second group telegraphed the appropriate authorities in the
sister state with request for a C. 0. D. reply as to liens. A third group
referred to a credit bureau in the other state for information on liens.
A fourth group reported that an occasional out-of-state car was pur-
chased with post-dated checks. The title papers offered by the seller
were forwarded to Harrisburg, and, if a clear title was issued, pay-
ment was not stopped on the check. Parenthetically, this reliance on
Harrisburg is misplaced. If the car has been reported stolen to the
state police, no title will issue, but no other check-up is made.3" And,
finally there were a few dealers who made no attempt to verify the
statements of their vendors, but these appeared to be mostly in the
"high pressure" class.39
While our investigation leads us to believe that used car dealers
as a class, do inquire as to liens or consciously assume the risk of not
inquiring, our sample is so inadequate that general business practices
cannot be determined, but the means for inquiring in the other state are
available, the cost is not prohibitive and the delay not an obstacle to
37. Conversations were had with only fifteen used car dealers in West Philadel-
phia. Information was obtained also from personal contact with relatives of automo-
bile dealers in two other states, which confirmed the information as to practices
supplied by those dealers with whom we talked in West Philadelphia. This example
is admittedly inadequate, but suggests that a careful study should prove illuminating.
38. The examination made at Harrisburg includes a check of the "Stolen Car"
index, which contains the numbers of all automobiles reported as stolen, embezzled, etc.
Thus, if the finance company knows of the "skip" before application is made for a
Pennsylvania title, and the police in the former state have notified the Pennsylvania
authorities, the procedure will give the dealer some protection. But no inquiry of the
other state is made by the Pennsylvania authorities. Letter of Nov. 13, 1947, from
Director of Motor Vehicles, Dept. of Revenue, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
39. New car dealers were the least aware of the problem, but since their sales are
often on the installment plan, involving a credit investigation of the purchaser, "skips"
are perhaps less likely to approach such dealers. Again the need for a careful investi-
gation of business practice is indicated.
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successful conduct of business.a' We feel that these last mentioned
facts are enough to enable a conclusion to be reached as to a proper
rule of law.
Let us return to a consideration of the relative position of the out-
of-state finance company-for example, a New York bank dealing with
an ostensible resident of its state (New York in our supposed case) and
a Pennsylvania dealer buying a car with New York plates. We believe
that the New York finance company by recording its security interest
in New York, has done all that it can do to avoid a possible fraudulent
resale. But has the Pennsylvania dealer done all he could or should
do when he buys a car with New York plates, if he only inquires as
to liens from the person selling him the car? Would it be too great
a burden to require all those purchasing out-of-state cars to make the
same inquiry that many persons in that line of business already make
as a matter of routine? Further support for imposing such a duty
can be found in the statistics showing that, on an average, six out of
ten automobile sales of both new and used cars are on the installment
plan.4° Common knowledge that a substantial portion of cars are sold
under conditions in which a security interest is created might well be
used to impose a duty to inquire or be subject to recorded liens. We
are aware that one court has already ruled that common knowledge of
a custom among finance companies not to put their security interest
on record in half of their installment sales was not sufficient to con-
stitute a dealer a purchaser with notice of an unrecorded lien.4 We
do not believe that this case is precedent against our contention here.
In the first place it does not appear that any testimony was given
as to the percentage of total sales that were made on credit subject to
a security interest; the unrecorded half of the installment sales could
have been half of a small portion of total sales. Second, the issue wa
whether the purchaser should be charged with notice of a security inter-
est in a particular car, not whether he should be under a duty to inquire
in another state. Finally a decision that the purchaser in that case was
not a purchaser in good faith would have created too much of a gap
in the recording law. Our contention is merely that a court could find,
39a. The speed of telegraph and air mail indicate that any fear that delay in com-
munications would clog transactions is unfounded. Less spectacular but important
in view of its cheapness is the speed of ordinary mail today. In connection with this
article the author communicated with numerous state authorities. Letters mailed
November 3rd, 1947, in Boston, Mass., Providence, R. I., and Richmond, Va., were
received at 9:30 A. M. November 4th, 1947. Letters mailed in Cheyenne, Wyo., and
Nashville, Tenn., on November 1st, 1947, were received November 4th, 1947, at
9:30 A. M.
40. Cox, THE ECONOMICS OF INSTALLMENT BUYING, Table 9, c. 2 (to be published
1948). Cf. HOLTHAUSEN, et al., THE VOLUME OF CONSUMER INSTALLMENT CREDIT,
1929-1938, Table A-6 (1940).
41. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Interstate Finance Corp., 236 Iowa 459, 18 N. W.
2d 178 (1945).
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on the evidence of the way the automobile market works, that a Penn-
sylvania, or a Noith Carolina, dealer is under a duty to inquire in New
York when buying a New York motor vehicle labelled as such by its
registration and plates.
In the light, then, of these facts, it becomes increasingly difficult
to understand why the court in the Sheldon case called the Pennsyl-
vania dealer a bona fide purchaser when he had made no inquiry at all.
In the Guthrie case, the plaintiff, the out-of-state vendor, urged argu-
ments against the local dealer similar to those we have made here.
His points were dismissed with the statement, "We are not inadvertent
to plaintiff's arguments." The case was remanded however, to resolve
a conflict in the evidence as to whether the car had been driven out of
Georgia before, or after, plaintiff had recorded his conditional sales
contract.
THE SECOND PURCHASER
Earlier in this discussion it has been stated that the Guthrie case
was correct in protecting the person who purchased in good faith from
a dealer, where the dealer had documented the car in his own state.
Once we abandon the idea that we are dealing with "jurisdiction" or
the "exercise of jurisdiction" to affect the interests of out-of-state
holders of liens on "chattels" brought into a state without their consent,
and concentrate on determining which of several persons involved in a
transaction involving an automobile is to bear the loss, it is clear that
the majority rule may go too far in permitting the out-of-state chattel
mortgagee to recover from sub-purchasers because sub-purchasers may
have no means to ascertain the facts. Consider for a moment the posi-
tion of the sub-purchaser. He is offered a car by a local dealer and
shown a certificate of title free of liens. Or, if we are in a "non-title"
state, he may (usually he doesn't!) search the records in the county
of his dealer's residence and place of business. Should he have to
inquire as to the dealer's vendor-perhaps even of the vendor of that
vendor-if the car has changed hands after its first sale to a resident of
the same state? On the other hand, what can the out-of-state chattel
mortgagee or conditional vendor do? He has done what was required
of him, and he doesn't yet know, we will assume, that the car has been
taken out of state. Here then, is a real case of two equally innocent
parties--i. e. two people each of whom has exercised the same degree
of care in the light of the means available to them.
Aside from this difference, there is another factor present. One
of these two parties has dealt directly with the wrongdoer and the other
has not, and we are really here allocating the incidence of loss caused
HORSE AND BUGGY LIEN LAW
by the dishonesty of the wrongdoer. Should that loss be placed
initially upon one who has not dealt with the wrongdoer or upon the
one who extended credit to him after investigation of the credit risk?
Which of the two should be subject to the honesty risk? Unhesitat-
ingly we suggest the out-of-state finance dealer, and persuasive analogy
exists for our selection, for the case is really similar to the "purchaser
in ordinary course of business" protected by the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act,42 or to the many situations in which the ultimate con-
sumer buying from a dealer has been protected against recorded liens.4
The concept that one cannot convey what he does not have, dies but
slowly, however. In this situation one can urge that the policy against
secret liens, the policy behind the recording provisions in all -of our
chattel security statutes, should be sufficient to prevail here and protect
the sub-purchaser. 44 After all, the sub-purchaser dealing with a car
locally registered or titled has no ground for inquiry, and the loss
should fall on the out-of-state lienor in the first instance, but ultimately
upon the first purchaser of the car in the state,45 unless that person can
prove he checked properly for liens as suggested above and was in-
formed that no liens existed. There is no sound reason why all pur-
chasers have to be protected. For example, the original Pennsylvania
purchaser dealing with a New York car upon which there was a
security interest validly created in New York, could be liable for con-
version, while a sub-purchaser dealing in Pennsylvania with what
appeared to be a Pennsylvania car could be protected.48
42. See, e. g., UNiFORm TRUST RECEIPrs ACT § 9(2).
43. See Note, Automobile Dealer Financing and the Bona Fide Purchaser, 43
Mc H. L. REv. 605 (1944).
44. Cf. The policy requiring the recording of conditional sale contracts, notwith-
standing their common law validity generally. Glenn, The Conditional Sale at Com-
mon Law and as a Statutory Security, 25 VA. L. REv. 559, 579-80 (1939). Support
may also be found in the so-called rule of "reputed ownership," which protects not only
the innocent purchaser, but the creditor. See, e. g., 1 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEY-
ANCES AND PREFERENCES §§ 341-343c (rev. ed. 1940).
45. Where the local purchaser loses the automobile to the finance company, pre-
sumably he has an action against his vendor for breach of warranty of title, in which
he can recover the money he has paid down and any installments paid. See note 31
mup ra.
46. This may not involve as radical a departure from the decided cases as may be
supposed. An analysis of the cases indicates that the resudt of many of the decisions
will not be changed by this theory. Many a decision under the so-called majority rule
involves a suit against the local dealer-purchaser who dealt with a vehicle bearing out
of state plates. A few decisions are contrary to the theory that the state of the regis-
tration and places should be controlling. Of sixteen cases examined, eleven in result
are consistent with the theory that a purchaser is bound by liens recorded in the state
indicated by the license tags and registration. See, e. g., Mercantile Acceptance Corp.
v. Frank, 203 Cal. 483, 265 Pac. 190 (1928); Metro-Plan, Inc. v. Kotcher-Turner,
Inc., 296 Mich. 400, 296 N. W. 304 (1941) ; Goetschius v. Brightman, 245 N. Y. 186,
156 N. E. 660 (1927). Contra: see, e. g., Gen'l Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Nuss, 195
La. 209, 196 So. 323 (1940) ; American Equitable Assurance Co. v. Hall Cadillac Co.,
93 Colo. 186, 24 P. 2d 980 (1933) ; Ragner v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 185
P. 2d 525 (Ariz. 1947) ; and the Guthrie and Sheldon cases, discussed in the text inso-
far as they protected the dealer.
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CONSE.NSUAL REMOVALS
So far we have been considering the typical fact situation involving
out-of-state finance company, migratory automobile and local bona fide
purchaser, on the supposition that the removal from the foreign state
was against the wishes of the finance company and without their con-
sent. Should their consent make any difference? Looked at purely
as a question of jurisdiction, or comity, and as a problem of extra-
territorial recognition of validly created interests in chattels, there is
good reason for arguing that consent should be immaterial.4' But
if considered as a problem of automobiles, against a background of
changed registrations and certificates of title, different considerations
come to the fore.
Of course, if the owner of a title interest consents to a removal
and refiles in the second state he will be protected as against pur-
chasers or creditors of his debtor. If he doesn't refile, he should- per-
haps be debarred from recovery from local dealers because he failed
to take available steps to protect himself. But should he always?
Suppose the car is not "titled" or registered in the second state. How
can the out-of-state holder of a security interest protect himself in a
state having a "title recording" statute, such as Pennsylvania? Sup-
pose in the Sheldon case the New York chattel mortgagee had been told
of the removal to Pennsylvania. He might record under the Chattel
Mortgage Act of 1945 48 in the county where the car was to be kept,
for the exception in Section 5 of that act for motor vehicles applies
by its terms only when the vehicle is one for which a certificate of title
is issuable under the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code. As such a
certificate is not issuable for a New York car temporarily in Penn-
sylvania in the hands of the New York owner, this exception in the
Chattel Mortgage Act does not apply. Section 10, however, is ap-
plicable for it expressly refers to property brought into the state sub-
ject to a lien and requires that the mortgage be filed in the county
in which the chattel is to be kept. Such a filing would, in practice,
be merely a trap, as we doubt whether county indices are ever checked
in Pennsylvania by used-car dealers in making a purchase. A far
simpler rule would require the dealer--or for that matter anyone else
dealing with a car bearing out of state plates and registration-to check
in the state indicated by the license until a certificate of title for the
car is issued in Pennsylvania, and thereafter protect bona fide pur-
chasers. In effect, this adopts the Florida court's solution and leaves
open the conditional vendor's possible cause of action against the dealer
47. See, e. g., GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 153, 154 (2d ed. 1938).
48. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, §§ 940.1, 940.5, 940.10 (Purdon, Supp. 1947).
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who saw and knew of the New York origin of the car. Such a ruling
would certainly be more consonant with the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act which preserves the out-of-state conditional vendor's interest
until ten days after the conditional vendor has notice of the new loca-
tion.49  And since that statute is in force in Pennsylvania, the rule
that similar statutes should be similarly construed o could have been
invoked as against the dealer.
PRESENT STATUTES
The foregoing discussion has dealt primarily with cases involving
the general recording acts, which, as we have seen, are usually held not
to apply to security interests validly created in other states when the
vehicle was located in the other state and the removal is with6ut the
finance company's consent. There have been many legislative attacks
upon the problem of the out-of-state lien. We have already referred
to the 1947 enactment in New Mexico which, in effect, refuses recogni-
tion to security interests in automobiles except when noted on a cer-
tificate of title. Several states have statutes requiring out-of-state
lienors to record within the state after a chattel in which they claim a
security interest has been within the state for some specified period, or,
perhaps, without a grace period.5
Since payments are generally due on a monthly basis, and since
the "skip" very rarely keeps up his payments, in statutes allowing a
three months' grace period, it may be fair to put the loss on the out-of-
state finance company for not tracing promptly upon failure to receive
payment. It should not be necessary to go to the lengths of the New
Mexico Statute and invalidate all out-of-state liens not shown on a
certificate of title. The Uniform Conditional Sales Act, as we have
seen, provides that the out-of-state lien is cut off ten days after the
seller has notice of the new location of the chattel. 2 By negative
implication, then, the lien is good until the conditional vendor receives
such notice. This may, however, take quite some time. The solution
offered in the Uniform Act, therefore, does not protect the local sub-
purchaser, as sales usually take .place quite soon after arrival in the
49. OUNIORM CoNDmoAL SALs ACT § 14; PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, § 432 (Pur-
don, 1931).
50. Cf. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law in HA. vAR LEaAL ESSAYS 213 if.
(1934) passim, where the point is well taken that the policy of cognate statutes is a
datum which should be of prime consideration in determining a rule of policy.
51. See, e. g., ALA. CODE, tit. 47, § 123 (1940) (three month grace period) ; GA.
CODE ANN., tit. 67, § 108 (Park, et al., 1935) (six month period) ; MIss. CODE ANN.,
tit. 7, § 870 (1942) (no grace period) ; OxRA. STAT. ANN., tit. 46, § 58 (1937) (120
day period); VA. CODE ANN., tit. 46, § 5197 (Michie, et al., 1942) (no period) ; W.
VA. CODE ANN., c. 40, § 3996 (Michie, et al., 1943) (three month period).
52. UNIFORM CoNDImOAL SALES ACT § 14.
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state, and before the out-of-state conditional vendor knows' of the
removal. Re-titling can be accomplished in a week or less. On the
other hand, statutes absolutely cutting off the out-of-state lien are un-
duly harsh, and, as has been shown, unnecessary where the car still bears
the registration of its home state.
DUPLICATE CERTIFICATES
But even dealing with an original certificate of title may not be
complete protection in view of the Duplicate Title racket. Of course,
a Certificate of Title may become lost or destroyed and so provision is
made for issuance of a duplicate."8 Certainly a person dealing with a
duplicate, designated as such, should inquire of the issuing authorities
to see if the original has turned up and whether any new liens are
entered thereon. But the Duplicate Title racket works the other way
and is really a neat little scheme. Carefully keeping his original title
certificate, the cunning car owner applies for a duplicate, claiming
destruction of the original. He is duly issued a duplicate. On this
duplicate he applies for a loan from a finance company, surrendering
the duplicate for recordation of the lien. Inquiry at the central record-
ing office indicates no liens and no reappearance of the original, so the
loan is made. After a short while, the car owner then sells the car, or
borrows elsewhere, but now he trots out his original title certificate
which is still free and clear of encumbrances. Lulled into security
by the clear original title, the purchaser is tricked. While the police
dragnet is out for the swindler, the two victims ruefully wonder which
of them will prevail in the eventual lawsuit and resolve that hereafter
they will make inquiry at the state capital even when dealing with
original certificates.
A PROPOSED SOLUTION
In summary, neither the majority nor the minority rules of the
text books appears to offer an adequate solution. The majority rule
holding that validly created security interests are not cut off by a re-
moval of the chattel to another state, is unfair to local purchasers who
buy after the car has been registered in their state. The minority rule
protecting all local purchasers is unfair to the finance companies in view
of the ease with which local purchasers can find out about liens in other
states. The solution of the Florida Court in Lee v. The Bank of
Georgia,54 protecting local purchasers dealing with an unencumbered
Florida title, is fair to local purchasers but dangerous to finance com-
53. See, e. g., PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 75, § 36 (Purdon, 1939).
54. Supra, p. 462.
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panies in view of the ease with which the Georgia owner can obtain a
Florida certificate of title. The various statutory solutions are also ob-
jectionable, as we have seen, because they appear to embrace the same
"all or nothing" solution that was found objectionable in discussing the
Sheldon and Guthrie cases; " that is, they involve a blanket refusal of
recognition to certain foreign created security interests, or to all such
interests after a period of time.
It seems to us that the Florida court's solution points the way, if
we can avoid the danger to finance companies mentioned above. We
believe an administrative solution to this difficulty does exist. When
application is made for a change of registration from one state to
another, the authorities in the new state should make inquiry for liens
in the state in which the car is presently registered. This does not
require reciprocity or interstate compact to become operative. Any
one state can do it for the protection of its own citizens. If the original
state records liens either on a certificate of title or centrally in the state
capital, then an inquiry to the proper state officer in the state capital
would reveal any liens, and incidentally upset anyone attempting a
Duplicate Title racket by borrowing in his home state on the duplicate
title and selling in another state by showing the original unencumbered
title. If the old state was one in which liens were recorded in the
county in which the property is kept or the owner resides, the author-
ities of the new state could obtain necessary information as to out-
standing security interests by mail or telegram from the appropriate
county clerk's office. This could be done by requiring the applicant
to furnish certificates from the other state on forms prescribed by the
state in which application is being made, or by direct inquiry. Any
lienor not filing his lien in the county of residence indicated by the
registration card of the car, would, of course, not be protected by this
system, but on balance of the equities he should not be protected.
Dealing with a person claiming residence in one county with respect to
an automobile, the registration of which indicates a different residence
should put the prospective lienor on notice that the discrepancy needs
reconciliation. Recall, too, the practice of filing in two places indicated
by the statement of facts in the Arizona case where a resident of Texas
registered his car in Louisiana. 0
Of course, in a state not requiring central recording, nothing
prevents the intending "skip" .from borrowing in one county, and then
changing his residence and obtaining a new registration at the new
residence. This possibility is one more argument against county
55. Supra, p. 467.
56. Supra, p. 465.
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recording and in favor of central recording. In some states the owner
merely notifies the authorities, and enters the change in ink on the
certificate until the next yearly change. Such an alteration would give
notice of two counties to a prospective purchaser, who could then
protect himself.
In effect our proposal is nothing more than an elaboration of the
provision in the present Pennsylvania statute requiring the authorities
to "use reasonable diligence" to ascertain whether the facts stated in
the application for a certificate of title are true.17 In the event that the
state in which the car was registered reported the existence of liens the
new title would be issued subject to those liens. Arizona, Idaho
and Utah have already adopted this practice.5 Others could follow un-
der existing legislation. For example, it could be done in states having
the Uniform Motor Vehicle Administration, Registration, Certificate of
Title and Anti-Theft Act, sponsored, among other organizations, by the
National Conference on Street and Highway Safety.59  Section 35 (a)
4 of said act provides that the state authorities may, in addition to the
applicant's statement as to encumbrances, require:
"Such further information as may reasonably .be required
by the department to enable it to determine whether the vehicle
is lawfully entitled to registration and the owner entitled to a
certificate of title."
As we have shown, information from the authorities of the state in
which the car was previously registered is necessary to enable the
57. See, e. g., PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 75, § 32 (Purdon, 1939). One other state, in
replying to inquiry, pointed out that since the fee for issuance of a certificate of title
was only fifty cents, obviously "reasonable diligence" was satisfied by reliance upon
statements in the application. This raises a question whether the fee should not be
increased to cover costs of reasonable investigation, and perhaps provide an insurance
fund from which payment could be made to out of state lienors whose liens are not
noted on a certificate of title through failure of the motor vehicle authorities to use due
diligence. See infra, p. 480.
58. Arizona furnishes a form to the applicant whose automobile was previously
registered in a non-title state requesting local authorities to certify to a lien search.
Letter of Oct. 31, 1947, from Div. of Motor Veh., Ariz. Hwy. Dept. As pointed out,
supra, p. 459, the same procedure should be adopted as to certain of the so-called "title"
states.
Utah requires an abstract from the office that records any liens against motor ve-
hicles, but again limits this to "non-title" states. Utah State Tax Comm., Letter of
Nov. 3, 1947. Of course, if the abstract is obtained by direct inquiry from one gov-
ernmental agency to another, there is less opportunity for fraudulent applications and
forged abstracts.
Idaho requires a notarized affidavit from the county in which the automobile
registration shows the car was located, in the case of non-title states. Letter February
3rd, 1948, from Department of Law Enforcement, Idaho.
59. The first National Conference on Street and Highway Safety resulted in the
appointment of a committee on uniformity of laws which during the period 1925-26
prepared the original text of the UNrFoRm VEHICLE CODE. The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws participated. THE PRESIDENT'S HIGHWAY
SAFETY CONFERENCE, REPo RT OF COmmiTTElE oN LAWS AND ORDINANCES, 15-16 (1946).
Act I of the Code, referred to in the text, is the basis of the statutes of California,
Delaware, Idaho, Maryland, Michigan, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. Id. at 19.
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registering authorities in the new state to determine whether the owner
has an unencumbered title. This information should be considered
necessary in states having the Uniform Act, since by Section 38 (3)
of that statute, the local authorities are directed to refuse registration
upon the ground that:
"The department has reasonable ground to believe that the
vehicle is a stolen or embezzled vehicle or that the granting of
registration or the issuance of a certificate of title would constitute
a fraud against the rightful owner or other person having a valid
lien upon such vehicle; ... "
It would, however, be advisable to amend Section 39 of the Uni-
form Act, which presently requires a comparison of engine and serial
numbers against the indices of registered motor vehicles and of stolen
and recovered vehicles. The amendment should add a new subsection
requiring the authorities to make appropriate inquiry as to encum-
brances in the state in which the car was previously registered.60
We must, however, coordinate the law relating to registration
with the law relating to sales of automobiles. The statute should also
provide that anyone dealing with a motor vehicle registered in another
state would be subject to any encumbrances validly created by the law
of such other state, or appearing of record there, unless he made ap2
plication for and received an unencumbered title in his own state. The
phrase "validly created . . . or appearing of record" is used advisedly
to overrule decisions similar to the Guthrie case,6 refusing validity
to an encumbrance appearing of record when a sale is made, but which
may not have been placed on record before the automobile was driven
across the state line. The statute should make it clear that any pur-
chaser or encumbrancer dealing with an automobile as to which a cer-
tificate of title has been issued by the state authorities would, notwith-
standing the general rule of the conflict of laws, be subject only to
such liens as may be recorded in the state capital. Perhaps entry on
the certificate of title should be prima-facie evidence thereof, although
the Duplicate Title scheme mentioned above indicates that central
recording goes as far as necessary since, under even the most modern
title acts, inquiry at the state capital must be made for full protection.
60. Cf. § 2 of Proposed Statute, infra, p. 481. The index of stolen vehicles required
to be maintained by the VEHriCLE CODE, includes "embezzled" vehicles reported by per-
sons having a lien or encumbrance thereon. Act I, § 76. But lienor's reports are to be
accepted only if the lienor has procured the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the
person charged with embezzlement. Id. § 75. This limitation may be necessary, with
-respect to locally registered vehicles, to prevent use of the department as a collection
agency. As to placing a "stop" on the registration of vehicles from other states, how-
ever, the usefulness of the limitation seems highly questionable.
61. See discussion supra, p. 462.
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No administrative scheme can operate without allowance for
human error. There may be slip-ups in the process of obtaining in-
-formation from other states, and there may be failure to note on a
certificate of title liens duly filed with the central office. Losses caused
by such errors of administration should be paid by the State from a
fund created by making a small additional charge for issuance of a
certificate of title. This method of spreading losses is not new. The
Torrens system of land registration provides for a fund to pay those
whose legitimate claims are cut off by the issuance of a Torrens Title. 2
Some recording acts prdvide for recovery against the official bond
of the Recorder of Deeds where the loss occurs through his improper
action."' And, apparently, a similar result would be effected under the
Continental droit administrative.3 Persuasive analogy could also be
found in the policy of the new Federal Tort Claims Act. 4 This pro-
vision is not however an integral part of the proposed solution and could
be omitted, in view of the Anglo-American feeling against imposing
liability on the government. On the other hand since the out-of-state
lien is to be cut off, a sense of fairness would suggest compensation
to the lienor and a system of insurance, as suggested, seems the best
method.
In addition to its function as a protection against foreign liens,
Pour proposal requiring an inquiry if the authorities of a foreign state
would disclose cases involving forged papers, unless the forger were
clever enough to register the car in the foreign state, too. Of course,
no absolute protection is offered by this scheme against a clever altera-
tion of the county of residence on the registration card of a non-title
state like New York. A telegram to the county indicated on the card
would, of course, receive a "no-lien" reply. But this is again just one
more argument Tor enactment of a central recording statute for auto-
mobiles in New York.
62. See, e. g., MASS. LAWs ANN., c. 185, § 97 (Michie, 1933). For a discussion,
see Cushman, Torrens Titles and Title Insurance, 85 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 589, 600 et seq.
(1937).
62a. See, e. g., 1 LADNER, CONVEYANCING IN PENNSYLVANIA § 127(c) (2d ed.
1941). Action must be brought within seven years after the improper act. Judge
Ladner feels that this is too short a time for real estate but for automobile financing
the limit would present no problems. The highest average duration in months of
installment indebtedness reported by dealers in new and used automobiles was 17.4
months in 1937, with a low of 9 months in 1945. Cox, THE ECONOMICS OF INSTALL-
MENT BUYING, c. III Table 14. (To be published 1948.)
63. Apparently failure to record a lien would constitute a faute de service for
which the adipinistrative courts in France would allow the citizen compensation from
the state. See, as to recovery for faute de service, Berth41emy, The Conseil d'Etat it&
France, 12 JOURNAL OF CoMPARATIVE LEGISLATION 23, 30-32 (1930).
64. 60 STAT. 842, 28 U. S. C. § 921 (Supp. 1946). For discussion, see Gellhorn
and Schenk, Tort Actions Against the Federal Government, 47 COL. L. REv. 722
(1947).
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TiE PROPOSED STATUTE
A statute embodying our proposed solution might read as follows,
the word "department" being used to designate the appropriate state
office charged with administration of the motor vehicle registration
statutes: 65
(The title and enacting clause are omitted)
"Section 1. Limitations on Issuance of Certificates of Title with
Respect to Motor Vehicles Registered in Other States. The depart-
ment shall not issue a certificate of title hereunder with respect to a
motor vehicle which has been registered in, or with respect to which
a certificate of title has been issued by another state, territory or
country until the department has received (a) from the applicant such
notarized copies of bills of sale as may be necessary to show his title
from, and any lien against, the last registered owner0 5a and (b) from
the proper officials of such other state, territory or country a statement
or statements setting forth the liens against such motor vehicle, appear-
ing of record, in such other state, territory or country. Any liens
shown by such bills of sale or statements shall be noted on the cer-
tificates of title issued in this state, until released in the manner pro-
vided for the release of liens created in this state.
"Section 2. Inquiry of Other States. The department upon re-
ceiving application for registration of any vehicle, or for the issuance
of any certificate of title with respect to any vehicle, registered in an-
other state, territory or country shall first obtain from the proper
officials of such other state, territory or country a statement, in form
satisfactory to the department, of all liens upon the said vehicles as
may appear of record in such state, territory or country, and the names
and addresses of all persons who may appear of record to be the holders
of liens upon the said vehicle.
"Section 3. Effect of Liens Valid in Other States. If a certificate
of title has been issued under this Act with respect to a vehicle, no lien
upon such vehicle, other than a lien dependent upon possession, valid
under the laws of or appearing of record in any other state, territory
or country is effective against the owner named in the certificate of
65. Wherever possible phraseology is that of the Uniform Code. It has been
suggested that provision should be made for inquiry of more than one state to pre-
clude the possibility that an automobile registered in New York would be re-docu-
mented in New Jersey without disclosing liens, and then brought into a state having
the proposed statute. In answer it is suggested that the car would be sold in New Jer-
sey, if a clean title was obtained there, rather than driven into a third state and re-
titled.
65a. Obviously the bill of sale to the last registered owner need be required only
in the case of cars formerly registered in the states not requiring conditional sales to
be recorded. See note 15 supra.
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title unless a statement with respect to such lien has been entered
upon the certificate of title issued by the department.
"Section 4. Notice of Liens of Record in Other States. Any
person in this state purchasing or acquiring a lien upon any vehicle
which is registered in or with respect to which an outstanding cer-
tificate of title has been issued by, another state, territory or country,
shall be subject to any lien upon said vehicle validly created or ap-
pearing of record in such other state, territory or country unless ap-
plication is made for an issuance of certificate of title and the department
issues a certificate without entry of such lien thereon.
"Section 5. Liability of State for Improper Certificate. This state,
to the extent hereinafter provided, hereby waives its immunity from
liability for the torts of its officers and employes and consents to have
its liability determined as hereinafter provided. The state shall be
liable for civil damages to any person whose lien on any vehicle is
invalidated by any act or omission of any employee of the department
while acting in the scope of his employment under this act or the act
of (here insert appropriate reference to act or acts relating to locally
created liens upon motor vehicles). Any person having a claim
against the state under this section may present same to the state in
the same manner as other claims are presented and if such claim is not
acted upon within thirty (30) days after said presentation or is, prior
to the expiration of said time, rejected in whole or in part, then said
person may sue the state in the (insert name of appropriate court)
with service upon the Attorney General. Such suit shall thereafter
proceed in the manner prescribed by law for the maintenance of a suit
against a private individual.
"Section 5. Definitions. As used in this act, unless the context
otherwise requires:
"(1) the term 'lien' means any interest of a conditional vendor,
conditional or bailment lessor, chattel mortgagee, entruster under a
trust receipt, or other person having a lien or encumbrance not de-
pendent upon possession created by agreement or statute.
"(2) the term 'lienor' means any person holding a lien interest."
CONCLUSION
Unless some method, such as is here recommended, is adopted
to secure co-ordination of the requirements for registration with auto-
mobile lien law, losses due to skip-state frauds will continue, and the
courts will continue to struggle with difficult decisions allocating these
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losses. It is possible, as has been suggested, to work out on common
law principles a solution that seems more equitable in the light of
present conditions than the "all or nothing" solutions of existing
verbal formulae. Purchasers knowing of the out-of-state origin of
the automobile should be bound by any liens valid or appearing of
record in the state from which the car has come. Purchasers having
no notice of out-of-state origin should not be. The cases seem to tend
in this direction, but the ease with which a registered owner can
change the state of registration presents possibilities of danger to
finance companies. Voluntary co-ordination of state authorities seems
difficult to obtain. 6 Nor will universal adoption of the positive record-
ing type of title law give adequate protection due to the duplicate title
racket. States can fairly give protection to their citizens only by
compelling their motor vehicle registration authorities to make inquiry
as to liens from the appropriate officials of the state in which the
automobile was formerly registered.
6 7
66. This is not the only situation in which state authorities have failed to make a
co-ordinated attack upon a problem. Even within a single state co-ordination would
solve many problems. It has been said that the failure of the Michigan Departments
of Revenue and of State to co-ordinate enforcement of the Sales Tax and Motor
Vehicle Title Act was the cause of a considerable "black market" in new cars
at substantially higher than list prices. MS. Report of Hon. W. McKay Skillman,
Recorder's Court, Detroit, Michigan, acting as a One-Man Grand jury, at p. 18.
judge Skillman also points out that many of the transactions involving illegal titling
of automobiles were interstate transactions. Id. at 27. Voluntary co-ordination be-
tween state authorities would disclose the practices.
67. Of course, proof of freedom from liens should not be required, perhaps, where
similar proof is not required when locally registered cars are re-registered. Section
482e(b) of CONN. GEm. STAT. (Supp. 1939) was declared unconstitutional in Bober v.
Connor, 8 Conn. Supp. 152 (1940), but the statute there excepted cars turned in for
the purchase of a new car and also contained no requirement that proof of ownership
be supplied by sellers of cars registered in Connecticut. While the court invoked the
commerce clause of the Federal Constitution, it was apparent that the statute was
enacted to benefit new car dealers at the expense of those solely engaged in the second
hand business and was, therefore, discriminatory.
